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This research examines new methods to assess and improve Physical Protection 
Systems (PPS), paying specific attention to a Navy Level 3 Restricted Areas, a special 
type of industrial and refit zone that normally handles high value units such as aircraft 
carriers and ballistic missile submarines, utilizing Model Based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE) and System of Systems (SoS) theory to create a framework which couples 
architectural level PPS design with detailed discrete event security assessment and 
prediction techniques in order to provide decision makers and acquisition authorities a 
more quantitative and effective method to holistically understand a PPS and the PPS’s 
internal and external interactions, allowing for improved capability and vulnerability 
analysis and the formulation of sound acquisition decisions. 
 
This research investigates four key questions: 
 
1.  Are there gaps in the end-to-end security assessment process caused by Seemly 
Unrelated Security Violations (SUSV), separated by distance and time, which affect the 
total security of a system, which heretofore have not been identified but may be able to 
be identified with robust MBSE? 
  
2.  What artificial limitations imposed by traditional security analysis models can be 
removed by the utilization of a MBSE operational item centric approach? 
 
3.  What improvements can be realized for a SoI by treating it as a SoS and artificially 
splitting it into two ontologically separate systems: the SoI and the security system?  
 
4.  What insight in security system design optimization can be gained from utilizing the 





The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Systems 
Engineering Vision for 2025 states that today, “Engineers are hard pressed to keep up 
with the evolving nature and increasing sophistication of the threats to our cyber-physical 
systems. Cyber-security is often dealt with only as an afterthought or not addressed at all” 
(INCOSE 2014, 36). The issues identified by INCOSE are both symptoms of the problem 
that security, like many modern engineering problems, is very complex – complex 
beyond our means. Magnifying the complexity of this problem, and differentiating it 
from other similarly complex systems, current tools are insufficient to enable the 
effective design and analysis of system security.  
Naval Research Program, Executive Summary 
Security Systems are subsystems of a System of Interest (SoI), designed to act as 
a boundary, with boundary conditions, to prevent or control access. Simple system 
security may consist of just a wall, and are thus just physical objects. Most modern 
system security consists of a multifaceted network of barriers, sensors, and humans, all 
interacting to fulfill the specific purpose of the security system.  Making these systems 
even more complex, the usage of networked computers as an essential part of system 
security provides an additional dimension of complexity, allowing threats to utilize cyber 
vulnerabilities to assist in overcoming reinforced physical security and vice versa. 
The objective of tools used to analyze security systems is to utilize different 
methods to simplify very complex, time-independent, and non-linear security systems, 
allowing for these systems to be evaluated in an efficient and meaningful manner.  Most 
tools analyze the objects in the security system instead of the effectiveness of the function 
of security, making it nearly impossible to identify non-linear vulnerabilities, such as 
those resulting across security domains, or from Seemly Unrelated Security Violations 
(SUSV), which can occur over a wide range of distances and times.   
Therefore, the Systems Engineering Community is in need of an architecture 
based framework that enables the assessment of the security function of a Systems of 
Interest that contains multi-domain security sub-systems and/or security sub-systems that 
are vulnerable to SUSVs. 
 
 
Findings and Conclusions (to include Process) 
 
Research is in progress.  Findings and conclusions will be available in the final report. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 
 This research proposes a methodological approach to address research questions 
1-4.  The Strategic Systems Program (SSP) Nuclear Weapons Security (NWS) has been 
engaged in a comprehensive effort to document the security architectures in a MBSE 
environment.  Given the existing data, an extension of this research is to assist SSP NWS 
use the data in their MBSE environment to address nuclear weapon security issues using, 
in part, the methodology being proposed by this research.  This effort was not envisioned 
during the proposal phase, but has been found to be necessary to implement these 
methodological approaches.  As such, the team is working with SSP NWS to help them 
understand their MBSE environment.  This work will continue after this NRP is 
completed. 
 
 
